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Abstract. From 26 July 2009 to 31 July 2009, the Dagstuhl Seminar
09311 Classical and Quantum Information Assurance Foundations and
Practice was held in Schloss Dagstuhl  Leibniz Center for Informat-
ics. The workshop was intended to explore the latest developments and
discuss the open issues in the theory and practice of classical and quan-
tum information assurance. A further goal of the workshop was to bring
together practitioners from both the classical and the quantum informa-
tion assurance communities. To date, with a few exceptions, these two
communities seem to have existed largely separately and in a state of
mutual ignorance. It is clear however that there is great potential for
synergy and cross-fertilization between and this we sought to stimulate
and facilitate.
The program included tutorials from both communities aimed at bring-
ing members of the the other camp up to speed:
 Intro to modern cryptography (Bart Preneel)
 Intro to provable security (Kenny Paterson)
 Intro to the modelling and formal analysis of cryptographic protocols
(Peter Ryan)
 Intro to the theory of quantum cryptography (Charles Bennett)
 Towards quantum key distribution with testable assumptions: a tu-
torial (Hoi-Kwong Lo)
 Introduction to Universal Composability (Dominique Unruh)
 Practical aspects of QKD (Gregoire Ribordy)
The workshop generated simulating and at times heated debates on the
merits and demerits of quantum cryptography. A participant from the
conventional cryptography community claimed that quantum cryptog-
raphy is essentially useless in practice because of its high cost, low key
rate, short distance, limited applications and the need to distribute the
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initial authentication key material. Moreover, his view was that quantum
cryptography is not an eﬀective counter-measure against the threat of
quantum computing. He believed that public key cryptographic systems
such as NTRU and McEliece could be used, if a quantum computer were
ever built in future.
The quantum community countered as follows. First, there is a need for
top secret long-term security and quantum cryptography can never re-
duce security. Second, to break a quantum cryptographic system, one
needs to eavesdrop today because there is no classical transcript for a
quantum communication. This means an eavesdropper has to invest in
quantum technologies in order to eavesdrop. Third, current technological
limitations of quantum cryptography such as key rate and distance may
be overcome in future. For instance, quantum repeaters could, in prin-
ciple, extend the distance of quantum cryptography arbitrarily. Fourth,
the cost of the quantum cryptographic systems may be absorbed through
savings in multiplexing of optical channel in telecom ﬁbers. Fifth, since
few quantum people are working on breaking NTRU or McEliece crypto-
systems these days, the security of those systems against quantum at-
tacks is largely unknown.
Perhaps, a more balanced view to take is that it is important to ex-
plore future cryptographic infra-structure. Quantum cryptography, while
probably not the only solution, may well play a part in such a future
infra-structure.
During the seminar, several participants presented their current research,
and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the
presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar
results and ideas are put together in this paper. Links to extended ab-
stracts or full papers are provided, where available.
Keywords. Quantum Information assurance, classical information as-
surance, cryptography, quantum computation
Measuring Entanglement with Universal Time-Bin Qubit
Analyzers
After an introduction into basic tools of quantum communication, qubits and
entangled qubits, I will motivate the importance of entanglement for under-
standing nature at the quantum level as well as for applications in quantum
cryptography and communication. I will then introduce how one can create and
measure photons and pairs of photons (in product as well entangled states) in
the laboratory, and discuss a new experiment that demonstrates the ﬁrst mea-
surement of time-bin entangled qubits using universal time-bin qubit analyzers.
Our measurement, which relies on the conversion of time-bin qubits into polar-
ization qubits followed by polarization measurements, yields violations of the
CHSH-Bell inequality and paves the road for tests of the Leggett inequality with
time-bin qubits. Furthermore, as explained in the presentation by G. Brassard,
our source has already been used for quantum coin ﬂipping, and is promising
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for hybrid quantum networks consisting of free-space and ﬁbre-optics links and
requiring encoding of quantum information in polarization as well as time-bin
qubits.
Keywords: Quantum Communication, Entanglement
Joint work of: Bussières, Felix; Slater, Joshua; Jin, Jeongwan; Godbout, Nico-
las; Tittel, Wolfgang
Is quantum information useful for security?
Romain Alleaume (ENS Telecommunications - Paris, FR)
I will try to partially answer, based on a review on recent work, the following
question:
Can QKD and more generally quantum information be useful to cover some
practical security requirements in current (and future) IT infrastructures?
I will in particular cover the following topics
 practical performances of QKD
 QKD network deployment - SECOQC project
 Capabilities of QKD as a cryptographic primitive - comparative advantage
with other solution, in order to cover practical security requirements




Charles H. Bennett (IBM TJ Watson Research Center, US)
After surveying the basics of quantum information (superposition, quantum
gates and measurements, the no-cloning theorem, entanglement, and the mean-
ing of the density matrix), I review the impact of quantum information on the
goals of cryptography and information security, including the theory and practice
of quantum key distribution, the no-go theorem for bit commitment, quantum
secret sharing and distributed computation, and quantum cryptanalysis.
Keywords: Quantum information entanglement QKD cryptography cryptanal-
ysis
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Publicity, Privacy and forgetfulness in Nature
Charles H. Bennett (IBM TJ Watson Research Center, US)
The most private information, exempliﬁed by which path a particle takes through
an interferometer, is quantum: after the experiment is over even God doesn't re-
member what "happened". Less private are classical secrets, facts known only
to a few, or information like the lost literature of antiquity that once was public
but has been forgotten over time. Finally there is information that has been
replicated and propagated so widely as to be infeasible to conceal and unlikely
to be forgotten. Modern information technology has caused an explosion of such
information, with the beneﬁcial side eﬀect of making it harder for tyrants to
rewrite the history of their misdeeds; and it is tempting to hope that all macro-
scopic information is permanent, making such cover-ups impossible in principle.
However, by comparing entropy ﬂows into and out of the Earth with estimates
of the planet's storage capacity, we conclude that most macroscopic information
for example the pattern of drops in last week's rain shower or rice grains in last
night's dinner is impermanent, eventually becoming nearly as ill deﬁned, from a
terrestrial perspective, as the which-path information of an interferometer.
Keywords: Quantum information privacy forgetfulness permanence
How to improve the price-performance ratio of quantum
collision search
Daniel Bernstein (University of Illinois - Chicago, US)
A quantum algorithm by Brassard, Hoyer, and Tapp ﬁnds collisions in a generic
b-bit hash function using O(2b/3) calls to the hash function. How well does the
same algorithm perform in more sophisticated cost measures than number of
hash calls? In particular, does the algorithm achieve an optimal tradeoﬀ between
the size of a quantum computer and the time taken by the computer to ﬁnd
collisions? This talk will show that the algorithm is highly suboptimal from this
perspective, and will explain how to do better.
Cost-beneﬁt analysis of quantum cryptography
Daniel Bernstein (University of Illinois - Chicago, US)
"Why quantum cryptography?" "SECOQC white paper on quantum key distri-
bution and cryptography." "Quantum cryptography: as awesome as it is point-
less." "The case for quantum key distribution."
Diﬀerent authors have come to wildly diﬀerent conclusions regarding the
value of quantum cryptography. Some of this variability can be explained by
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implicit diﬀerences in models of what users value; this talk will present a uniﬁed
analysis explicitly parametrized by the model. A surprisingly large part of the
variability stems from easily correctable errors; this talk will explain how future
authors can recognize and avoid the most common pitfalls.
Loss-Tolerant Quantum Coin Flipping
Gilles Brassard (Université de Montréal, CA)
Coin ﬂipping is a cryptographic primitive in which two spatially separated play-
ers, who do not trust each other, wish to establish a common random bit. If we
limit ourselves to classical communication, this task requires either assumptions
on the computational power of the players or it requires them to send messages
to each other with suﬃcient simultaneity to force their complete independence.
Without such assumptions, all classical protocols are so that one dishonest player
has complete control over the outcome. If we use quantum communication, on
the other hand, protocols have been introduced that limit the maximal bias that
dishonest players can produce. However, those protocols would be very diﬃcult
to implement in practice because they are susceptible to realistic losses on the
quantum channel between the players or in their quantum memory and mea-
surement apparatus. In this talk, we introduce a novel quantum protocol and we
prove that it is completely impervious to loss. The protocol is fair in the sense
that either player has the same probability of success in cheating attempts at
biasing the outcome of the coin ﬂip. We also give explicit and optimal cheating
strategies for both players. Furthermore, we report on our successful implemen-
tation of the protocol.
Keywords: Coin ﬂipping, loss tolerance, unconditional security, experiments
Joint work of: Berlin, Guido; Brassard, Gilles; Bussieres, Felix; Godbout,





See also: to appear in Physical Review A
Post-quantum cryptography
Tanja Lange (TU Eindhoven, NL)
Overview talk of the possibilities of post-quantum cryptography, that is cryp-
tography that are conjecturally secure against attacks by quantum computers
(and, of course, secure against attacks with classical computers).
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Such crypto primitives include Merke hash trees and multivariate cryptogra-
phy for signatures and lattice and code based crypto for encryption.
Together with Bernstein and Peters we have some recent results on attacking
code-based cryptography.




Towards QKD with testable assumptions
Hoi-Kwong Lo (University of Toronto, CA)
There is a big gap between the theory and practice of quantum key distribution
(QKD). In principle, QKD oﬀers unconditional security guaranteed by the laws
of physics. In practice, all security proofs are based on speciﬁc physical models
of a QKD system. A physical model contains assumptions. When an assumption
of a physical model is violated, a security proof for a QKD system falls apart.
In this talk, I will review standard assumptions in security proofs (including
the single mode assumption and phase randomization assumption) and discuss
how they might be enforced in practice. Moreover, I will discuss our recent work
on proving the security of QKD with an untrusted source. Furthermore, I will
describe our recent quantum hacking experiment against a commercial QKD
system. Here, I exploit the detection eﬃciency mismatch between two detectors.
In particular, I show how an eavesdropper, Eve, can violate the fair sampling
assumption (in Bell-inequality testing or in QKD) by manipulating an ancillary
variable (e.g. arrival time of a quantum signal). I will conclude by pointing out
some future directions.
Keywords: Quantum cryptography
Geometry of abstraction in quantum computation
Dusko Pavlovic (University of Oxford, GB)
Modern cryptography is based on various assumptions about computational
hardness and feasibility. But while computability is a very robust notion (cf
Church's Thesis), feasibility seems quite sensitive to the available computational
resources. A prime example are, of course, quantum channels, which provide fea-
sible solutions of some otherwise hard problems; but ants' pheromones, used as
a computational resource, also provide feasible solutions of other hard problems.
So at least in principle, modern cryptography is concerned with the power and
availability of computational resources.
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The standard models, used in cryptography and in quantum computation,
leave a lot to be desired in this respect. They do, of course, support many inter-
esting solutions of deep problems; but besides the fundamental computational
structures, they also capture some low level features of particular implemen-
tations. In technical terms of program semantics, our standard models are not
fully abstract. (Related objections can be traced back to von Neumann's "I don't
believe in Hilbert spaces" letters from 1937.)
I shall report on some explorations towards extending the modeling tools of
program semantics to develop a geometric language for quantum protocols and
algorithms. Besides hiding the irrelevant implementation details, its abstract
descriptions can also be used to explore simple nonstandard models. If the time
permits, I shall describe a method to implement teleportation, as well as the
hidden subgroup algorithms, using just abelian groups and relations.
Keywords: Quantum algorithms, categorical semantics, Frobenius algebra, clas-
sical structure
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2010/2362
An Introduction to "Modern" Cryptology
Bart Preneel (K.U. Leuven, BE)
Our talk has presented an overview of the status of modern (classical) cryptology.
We have compared the challenges in communications and computer security
settings, historically known as COMSEC and COMPUSEC respectively. We have
discussed the evolving attack models: ﬁrst the communicating parties Alice and
Bob want to protect themselves against an opponent, subsequently Alice or
Bob can be malicious; today we also consider a setting in which Alice tries to
subvert the cryptographic device provided by a third party (e.g. in the context
of Digital Rights Management). In this setting implementation level attacks are
important. In a second part of the talk we have given an overview of the state of
the art and challenges for several cryptographic primitives: block ciphers, hash
functions, MAC algorithms, public key encryption and digital signatures. We
have concluded with a discussion on the relation between applications, protocols,
primitives, building blocks, and cryptographic assumptions.
Keywords: Cryptology, models, implementation attacks, block ciphers, hash
functions, MAC algorithms, public key encryption
Poled Fibre, with a Twist: Towards polarization-entangled
photon pair generation in poled silica ﬁber
Li Qian (University of Toronto, CA)
Polarization entangled photon pairs are an important resource used in quantum
cryptography.
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They are typically generated via spontaneous parametric down conversion
(SPDC) processes in a nonlinear optical crystal, and then collected into an op-
tical ﬁber for long-distance transmission, such as in the case of quantum key
distribution. Alternatively, entangled photon pairs can be generated directly in
ﬁber, which is more appealing because it eliminates the bulky and lossy ﬁber
coupling stage. High ﬂux of entangled photon pairs can potentially be achieved
in ﬁber, where the interaction length for the SPDC process can be made large.
Additionally, unlike with nonlinear crystals, properties such as birefringence and
dispersion can be easily tailored through ﬁber design.
However, SPDC processes cannot take place in conventional ﬁber because
silica, being isotropic, lacks the required second-order nonlinearity. Current re-
search on in-ﬁber generation of entangled photons has been concentrated on the
spontaneous four-wave-mixing (SFWM) processes, which uses the third-order
nonlinearity of silica glass. SFWM processes, while successful in producing en-
tangled photon pairs, also have limitations, most notably, the contamination
from Roman scattering.
We are investigating an alternative approach of generating entangled photon
pairs - using thermally poled silica ﬁber, which exhibits an eﬀective second-
order nonlinearity (χ(2)). The advantages of this approach, as compared with
the SFWM approach, include: (1) The required interaction length for eﬃcient
SPDC is much smaller; (2) Quasi-phase matching is possible through a periodic
erasure of induced χ(2) by UV exposure, giving much ﬂexibility to the choice of
pump, signal, and idler wavelengths; (3) Raman scattered photons are spectrally
well separated from the signal and the idler, eliminating the need for cryogenic
cooling; (4) Suppressing the pump photons at the output is made much easier due
to the large wavelength separation between the pump and its daughter photons,
and can be implemented with ﬁbre-based ﬁlters; (5) Maximally polarization
entangled photons can be directly generated in this χ(2) ﬁbre in a straightforward
way. In this talk, I will present the factors that need to be considered in this
approach, including:
 How to optimize the second-order nonlinearity during thermal poling
 How to achieve (quasi) phase matching for the SPDC process
 The consequence of ﬁber birefringence and how to determine the values of
the individual χ(2) tensor elements
 The consequence of ﬁber twisting and how to utilize it to enhance a speciﬁc
SPDC process for generation of entangled photon pairs.
Keywords: Entangled photon generation, SPDC, nonlinear ﬁber, thermally
poled ﬁber
Tutorial: Modelling and Analysis of Security Protocols
Peter Ryan (University of Luxemburg, LU)
A tutorial on concepts and technqiues in the design and analysis of classical
cryptographic protocols.
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Keywords: (Classical) cryptographic protocols, formal analysis technqiues and
tools
Limited-Quantum-Storage Cryptography: From Theory to
Practice
Christian Schaﬀner (CWI - Amsterdam, NL)
In 2005, the idea of basing the security of two-party quantum protocols on the
diﬃculty of storing quantum information has been proposed. In this talk, I will
give an overview over the developments in this research area.
I will cover the basic protocol for 1-2 oblivious transfer and touch on more
recent issues such as composable security deﬁnitions and practical implementa-
tion problems the latter of which are similar to those encountered in quantum
key distribution.
Keywords: Quantum cryptography, two-party protocols, limited quantum stor-
age
Universally Composable Quantum Oblivious Transfer
Dominique Unruh (Universität des Saarlandes, DE)
We show that a statistically secure, universally composable quantum oblivious
transfer protocol can be realized from a commitment functionality.
Hence it is possible to construct universally composable, statistically secure
protocols for any reactive functionality from a commitment.
This stands in contrast to the classical setting where this is known to be
impossible. Furthermore, we discuss connections to long-term security.
Keywords: Quantum cryptography, oblivious transfer, universal composability
Full Paper:
http://arxiv.org/abs/0910.2912v1
See also: Technical Report, arXiv:0910.2912v1 [quant-ph]
